rappaport is partners with mike haber's mom. haber and milton share space.
more on this a bit later
i decent from rumpole
milt is not an great lawyer and will not be a fair judge to all. i hope he proves me wrong if elected
Rumpole replies: This much we know dear reader- you have not read any legal opinions and you have no hope of becoming a judge, much less a janitor in the courthouse. The word is "dissent".
So let me understand. Killing someone while you are driving a car drunk is worth 30 days. But lying about it to the cops, fleeing the scene and then the jurisdiction, not being cooperative and honest is worth 12 year and 4 months? Give me a break. This Stallworth case makes me sick.
I wrote in yesterday because I have a crush on an older lawyer. I find out today he is (sigh) married. I will not pursue him. I just have this weakness for older cuddly guys.
Rumple says: Anyone know who this "hottie" is? I think I fit the bill. I'm cuddly.
And with friends like these....
For what it is worth, I will respond to Rumpole's request to weigh in on the Hirsch quandary.
First of all, in all of the years I have known Milt, my initial duty has been to try to comprehend the intent of his words, while he is busy trying to prove that his GPA was completely earned [Yes, I saw it when the SAO hired him]. How in the world his client thought that he understood that he was being told to commit a crime and flee is beyond the realm of common belief.
Next, I look at the actual words printed in the New Times. Suggesting that the case was so strong against his client that he would have to go to the imaginary planet Vulcan [where Milt probably knows that his descendants lived] cannot be parsed to mean: I cannot defend your case. Go flee the jurisdiction.
In truth, Milt is a bit full of himself [think Graf Zeppelin] and I could not imagine him placing his grand view of himself in jeopardy for ANY client. I do not mean this as a slur, but some people do not care enough about their clients to step one inch over the line. Telling a killer to flee is beyond the pale.
Milt's level of self-assurance has often allowed me to rely upon his word. I cannot conceive of his acting in some way that might permit one to prove that he had fallen from the tower of perfection.
Finally, Milt denied, under oath, any improper advice to his client. The Judge accepted his testimony as truthful. A disgruntled client should not change how we all see Milt - with all his good and bad points [he actually is human], he is no liar.
Judge Glick ruled on admissibility and credibility. Now it is up to the investigators to determine if there is anything else to review. Rappaport's statements and Hirsch's are VERY different.
I see absolutely no reason to think that Milt should not be a Judge. Yes, a potential windbag - but a very bright one. One for whom I will both advocate and vote.
Milt is pompous and arrogant and his sense of humor is not what he thinks it is. Nevertheless, I give him the benefit of the doubt because he is a very knowledgeable lawyer. Clients falsely turning on their lawyers to better their own situation (especially in federal court) is nothing new.
And finally, file this under the "more information than we need" file:
Rumpole: Let me see if I can explain why a judge might not listen to the tapes before ruling on this motion:
Presumably (though it's not clear from the article) the postconviction motion is premised upon a claim ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to establish a right to relief, the defendant must meet a two-pronged test by showing:
1. Trial counsel's performance was constitutinally "deficient"; that is, his actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
2. As a result of counsel's action (or inaction) the defendant suffered "prejudice." In the context of a plea (as opposed to a trial) this requires the defendant to establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's action, the defendant would not have entered a plea, but instead would have insisted on going to trial. (Defendant need not prove he would have prevailed at the trial, only that he would have insisted on going to trial as opposed to entering the plea.)
If a defendant fails to establish either one of the two prongs, his postconviction claim must fail. So, the judge could "assume" for the sake of discussion that Hirsch made the statements which the defendant claims Hirsch made (and which defendant recorded). Even if Hirsch made these statements, however, (and even if such statements are sufficient to establish the first prong of deficient performance), the court could find that the defendant failed to establish the prejudice prong. In this case, for example, the court could conclude that there is no way that Hirsch's statements (assuming they were made)affected the defendant's ultimate decision to enter a plea. After all, the defendant fled the country, was captured and returned to Florida, continued to have Hirsch as his attorney, entered a plea with Hirsch as his attorney, was sentenced, and only then did he raise this issue regarding statements Hirsch allegedly made. The defendant would have to establish that, but for the statements by Hirsch (i.e., encouraging him to flee)there is a reasonable probability that he defendant would not have entered a plea, but rather would have gone to trial. The court could have easily determined that the defendant cannot establish this, and thus rest on the failure to prove the "prejudice" prong, making it unnecessary to determine, as a matter of evidentiary fact, whether Hirsch did or did not make the statements.
As a practical matter, of course, this allows the trial court to avoid opening up the can of worms that would inevitably follow from listening to (and thus making public) the tape-recorded conversations (assuming that they are otherwise admissible).
Very often a trial court will make a decision on post-conviction relief based solely on a finding of no "prejudice" so that the court can avoid the thornier task of having to rule on whether trial counsel's performance was deficient. This saves face for the trial counsel and is a perfectly acceptable way to analyze a motion for postconviction relief when it is clear that the defendant cannnot establish prejudice.