When you see something that is not right, not fair, find a way to get in the way and cause trouble. Congressman John Lewis
JUSTICE BUILDING BLOG
Saturday, July 17, 2010
HOW EMBARRASSING
Thursday, July 15, 2010
THIRD DCA ROUNDUP-BONUS SUPREME COURT CASE EDITION.
We note from the outset the divergent positions taken by the two opinions certified to be in conflict. For its part, the Fourth District seems to have concluded that as a per se matter, an officer‟s reading of Miranda warnings during an otherwise consensual encounter will always result in a Fourth Amendment seizure. See Raysor, 795 So. 2d at 1072. By contrast, the Second District has reasoned that because the warnings are intended to be a protective measure, Miranda warnings given during a consensual encounter may contribute to a seizure finding within the totality-of-the-circumstances framework. See Caldwell, 985 So. 2d at 605. Thus, we are presented with two questions of law. First, does the reading of Miranda warnings result in a per se seizure under the Fourth Amendment? Second, if the first question is answered in the negative, what impact do the warnings have within the totality-of-the- circumstances/reasonable person analysis set out in Mendenhall?...
In Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993), this Court identified three levels of police-citizen encounters. The first level, a “consensual encounter,” involves minimal police contact and does not invoke constitutional safeguards. During a consensual encounter, an individual is free to leave at any time and may choose to ignore the officer‟s requests and go about his business. Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186. The second level is an “investigatory stop,” during which an officer “may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” ...
The issue we must resolve in this case is whether Officer Crisco‟s actions transformed what began as a first-level consensual encounter into a second-level investigatory stop. See Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186....
We emphasize that Miranda warnings are not required in any police encounter in which the suspect is not placed under arrest or otherwise in custody under Ramirez. See McCarty, 468 U.S. at 440 (noting “the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda”)...
We first address whether Miranda warnings, as a per se matter, will always
transform a consensual encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment...
As we noted in G.M., “[t]he United States Supreme Court has consistently maintained that per se rules are inappropriate in Fourth Amendment analyses of whether a „seizure‟ has occurred.” 19 So. 3d at 978...
In accordance with the cases discussed above, we hold that to the extent the Fourth District determined that the mistaken administration of Miranda warnings results in a seizure as a matter of law, its conclusion was error. The proper test is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel
free to end the encounter and depart. While an individual act on the part of an officer may constitute a show of authority that contributes to a seizure finding, we again reject the notion that any single factor, taken alone, will be conclusive in every case in which it appears
Having rejected the Fourth District‟s conclusion that Miranda warnings will always result in a seizure during an on-the-street police encounter, we must determine to what extent, if any, Miranda warnings increase the coercive nature of such an encounter...
Miranda warnings are a formality of arrest and are required only at the time of an arrest or prior to custodial interrogation. Further, the warnings are associated in the public mind with the spectacle of an individual being placed under arrest. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that an individual who is given Miranda warnings during what begins as a consensual encounter may interpret those warnings as a restraint on his or her freedom....
Based on our above discussion, we believe that the reading of Miranda warnings during a consensual police encounter might add to the coercive nature of that encounter under at least some circumstances. ...
Further, we hold that Miranda warnings do not result in a seizure as a matter of law. While we do not discount that possibility that Miranda warnings may increase the coercive atmosphere of a
police-citizen encounter outside the context of a custodial interrogation, we find that the warnings did not result in a seizure in this case.
Rumpole says: We're going to form the Lawyers for Per Se Rules club. Who's in?
SWEET REVENGE
New findings indicate that swapping sugar (calories) for fake sugar (no calories) may not be the best diet trick. Eating artificially sweetened foods may actually make you eat more than you would have had you eaten the regular version. Experiments conducted at Purdue University Investigative Behavior Research Center found that a group of rats fed saccharin-sweetened yogurt ate more calories, gained more weight and put on more body fat than a group fed yogurt sweetened with sugar. The study's authors explain that artificial sweeteners may affect the body's ability to regulate calorie intake and metabolism.
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
MAYBE THERE'S STILL HOPE
``He was twice the legal limit. He should have known better,'' VanderGiesen said of Spencer's blood-alcohol level. ``However, he can't be locked up the rest of his life . . . These are young guys who all had something going for them. Everybody lost here.''
Here's our point- we all have for sometime now laboured in a criminal court system where the state almost always seeks the maximum penalty for most serious cases. The fact is that while many serious cases do mandate the maximum penalty, not all of them do.
Sometimes good people do bad things for inexplicable reasons.
Sometimes people who are not criminals commit criminal acts.
It used to be that participants in the criminal justice system laboured for justice. That included a just sentence. This was before the age of political correctness- and before the time that a victim's subjective (and fully understandable) desire for the maximum punishment outweighed what we all otherwise knew was a just sentence-
It is therefore refreshing to see prosecutors act with an understanding that this defendant- whose crime was horrible- does not deserve to have his life completely ruined.
This is a difficult proposition to defend. A young man made a tragic decision to drive impaired. In doing so, he killed his friend. He needs to be punished and its easy to say that he should be sentenced to prison for the rest of his life because he took a life.
We are not suggesting that people who drive impaired should not be punished. We are not in any way diminishing the never ending pain the parents and family of the victim are suffering. We are applauding the result which in some basic way recognizes that two wrongs don't make a right.
For over twenty years now the criminal justice system has been a pendulum swinging towards retribution and excessive sentencing . The momentum of this pendulum has been driven by politicians running for office on a "get tough on crime" platform. Not many people get elected by espousing the more sophisticated view that the punishment should fit the crime.
However, in this case, Judge Marin and two prosecutors in his division decided to not do the simple thing- which would have been to insist on the maximum sentence of 30 years. Judge Marin and the ASAs did the right thing. They sought a sentence that was fair and just. These two prosecutors sought justice, not vengeance. They are to be congratulated.
The unfortunate thing about this story is just how surprising this result is.
See You In Court.
Monday, July 12, 2010
HATCH TO VOTE NO
The first important standard is experience. Ms. Kagan has never before served as a judge — and, in addition, has little legal experience of any kind. Over the Supreme Court’s long history, justices who were nominated without past judicial experience have had an average of 21 years of legal practice. Ms. Kagan has two. Her experience is instead academic and political.
GOAAAAALLLL!!
Saturday, July 10, 2010
TEA TIME WITH RUMPOLE
Thursday, July 08, 2010
3rd DCA ROUNDUP-KEEPING COOL EDITION
It's hot. You're tired. Your client is cranky. The AC isn't keeping up with the heat and the pool feels like a warm bath. Welcome to Miami in July.

On May 13, 2009, before the present case was filed, this Court reversed a trial court order permitting PD11 to decline representation in all future third-degree felony cases by reason of PD11’s excessive caseload. See State v. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), review granted, No. SC09-1181 (Fla. May 19, 2010). We held then, and continue to hold, that while a trial court must determine whether counsel is sufficiently competent, this determination must occur on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 802.
COME ON JUDGE MILLER- BE A JUDGE.
Here's the thing about Judges we don't understand. They spend all this time trying to get elected or appointed, and then when they get on the bench they don't want to do the scut work. It's "Tee-times" "and who's getting the check at Joes?" that they all worry about.
Rumpole's Fourth Rule of Law: When you rely on someone else to do the dirty work, it only makes matters worse.
The appellant appeals from the trial court’s order striking his motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 as facially insufficient. The order, taken verbatim from the State’s response, strikes the appellant’s motion without prejudice for failure to meet the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(e)(2)(C).
Here's a judicial practice tip:
when you deny someone's motion, you need to cite THE CORRECT STATUTE!
Miller gets himself reversed, and we think publicly humiliated by cutting and pasting (or just old fashioned copying off of someone else's paper) from the State's response. No one bothered to read the statute. It's called fact checking. After he typed his order, did he bother to review it and double check the statute before signing it? NOPE.
And for that Judge David Miller, you get your own wing in RUMPOLE'S HALL OF SHAME. It's the "not checking your work and copying from the State" wing, and hopefully it will not get over crowded.
See you in court, where because of our lovely robed readers, there's never a dearth of things to chuckle about.
Wednesday, July 07, 2010
7/7
Adrien was accused of ethnic electioneering when he tried to run as Peter “Camacho” Adrien.
Adrien did not return calls for comment by deadline.
The poll also offered a glimpse of what could lie ahead for those in contested races.
While Adrien received the lowest scores of any sitting judge, his opponent received the highest scores of any judicial candidate.
Miami attorney Samantha Ruiz Cohen said she was humbled after hearing that more than 85 percent considered her qualified to sit on the bench, and she hopes the general public will trust the views of legal insiders in making their choices at the polls.
“Especially because I’m running against an incumbent, I think it speaks volumes, and I’m very humbled by these results and the support. The results speak for themselves. They really do,” she said. “It’s a strong message that the lawyers are sending out.”
In another race, Assistant Public Defender Manny Alvarez scored slightly better than the sitting judge he’s running against, Circuit Judge Edward Newman. Alvarez received an approval of 81 percent to Newman’s 78 percent.
Tuesday, July 06, 2010
TUESDAY JULY 6
5 ... Police Department, and you have provided
6 me proof of service for both of the officers, and the
8 What I would do is: Hold the subpoenas for two
9 working the days -- the second working day will be July
10 7th, 2010 -- for the officers to provide good just
11 cause. If the officer does, I will continue the
12 hearing with a permit, if eligible, and maintain the
13 subpoenas in effect; however, should the officers not
14 provide good just cause within the two working days,
15 you may seek enforcement of the subpoenas, and a
16 failure to appear will not invalidate the suspension
17 any longer.
18 If Counsel -- I'm sorry -- Counsel has the
19 responsibility to contact this office, after the two
20 working days of this review, to verify whether good
21 just cause was received or not. And, if not, you must
23 seeking enforcement of the subpoenas on ...
24 and ....
25 The record shall remain open for ten days, which
page 2
1 will be July 13, 2010, for the sole purpose of Counsel
2 providing written proof of seeking enforcement of the
4 If written proof of seeking enforcement is
5 received timely, a continuance will be granted without
6 a permit.
7 If written proof of seeking enforcement is not
8 provided by July 13, 2010, a final order will be
9 entered within seven working days of the close of this
10 review.