THE END OF INNOCENCE

I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.
In Re: Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 327 (1970),  J. Harlan, concurring. 
The United States of America has the greatest legal system in the world, built upon the principle that it is so unjust to convict an innocent individual that it is better that some guilty people go free. 

Or that's what "They" want you to think.

“Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person,” Justice Byron R. White,  Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)

The title of the post links to the NY Times article on post conviction relief and the sad case of  Edward Elmore. 

From half a lifetime spent in the criminal justice courts of this nation, here is what we have learned:

The system is far from perfect, as any system administered by humans would be. The difference however between say airline pilots, or heart surgeons and criminal defense attorneys is that the standards for becoming a criminal defense attorney, once a person has passed the Bar, are non-existent. 

Any lawyer can take a fee, wander over to the REGJB and blow the arraignment (we have seen this regularly, especially when things get tough in civil court.) There are currently standards in Florida for attorneys handling death penalty cases, and that's a good start. But any civil hack can file a NOA in a murder case where the state is not seeking death,  or a sexual assault case,  or a child exploitation case, and ruin the life of a client facing lifetimes of minimum mandatories. 

Currently the United States Attorneys Office is lobbying hard to change the rules for federal habeas cases- and not in a way that makes is easier for the innocent person convicted to get relief.  The state and federal courts are overwhelmed with mostly pro se petitions seeking relief, and no one wants to pay for the  staff necessary to provide adequate review of that never ending mountain of petitions. 

What keeps us up at night is that tucked away in that stack of frivolous 2254, 2255 and 3.850s on some Judge's desk is one motion, not in a death case-so no special attention is paid to it- in which some innocent man or woman is serving five or ten or twenty years or life in prison for a case they did not commit. 

Make no mistake that in this country's criminal justice system, it's not the result, but the process that matters. Were the rules followed? Was the accused afforded due process? Nice inquiries, but for the courts (and unfortunately for innocent clients) the inquiry ends there.

Because in the United States of America, despite what they tell you, innocence really doesn't matter. See, Patterson, v.  New York, supra. 

Well at least in a capital case it's different, right? It must be unconstitutional to execute an innocent person, correct? 
Nope. 

We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that, in a capital case, a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.

We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that, in a capital case, a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief... But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) 


So there, in all it's naked shocking truth, you have it: we are a country that values procedure- "rules must be followed and orders obeyed" (and where, disturbingly, have we heard that before in the 20th century?) over justice. Actual innocence is no bar to being executed, as long as the rules were followed. Because preventing the execution of an innocent person is too "disruptive" to our precious system. 

See You In Court.  

We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that, in a capital case, a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.

We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that, in a capital case, a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.

We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that, in a capital case, a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.